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Credit Effects in the
Monetary Mechanism
Introduction
onetary transmission is one of the great mysteries in
economics. Namely, how can purchases or sales of just
a few billion dollars in securities in the overnight reserve
market have such large, persistent effects on overall spending?
The traditional monetary transmission mechanism—a change
in reserves alters interest rates and deposits, which in turn
affects spending—begs a number of questions. For one, can a
50-basis-point change in the federal funds rate really make
such a difference for investment in inventories, structures,
housing, consumer durables, and other “interest-sensitive”
sectors?Isitmerelythathigherinterestratesreducethepresent
value, and hence demand, for such investments? Why does a
shock to the federal funds rate leave spending depressed for a
year or more after the fundsrate returnstoits initiallevel? It is
good to acknowledge these “long” lags, but acknowledgment
hardly explains them.
Credit effects, neglected in thetraditional monetary
mechanism, may solve some of the mystery. Given
informational frictions in the right markets, tight monetary
policy will alsocausecontractions inbank lending and
therefore declines in spending by bank-dependent borrowers.
This channel of policy is typically referred to as the narrow
bank lending channel, discussed in some detail in Bernanke




firms’ balance sheets and limiting their ability to grow and
spend. Moreover, the increased risk of firms shirking their
loans in theaftermathof tightpolicy may also cause theoverall
supplyof funds tofall(Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999).
Note that both credit effects—the narrow bank lending
channeland the broader balance-sheet mechanism—are
endogenous to the monetary policy processyet are completely
missing from the mostly frictionless monetary mechanism.1
Policymakers at times have also resorted to more direct
actions to limit bank credit “availability,” such as interest rate
ceilings, credit controls, and jawboning (Romer and Romer
1993). In contrast to the credit channels,t h e s ea c t i o n sa r en o t
inherent or endogenous to the monetary mechanism; they are
ad hoc actions intended to reduce bank loan supply without
leading to higher loan rates (for politicalreasons, or because
policymakers view higher rates alone as ineffectivein curbing
borrowing and spending).
This paper looks for evidence of both types of credit
effects—those that are endogenous to the monetary
mechanism and those that are exogenous—using information
on banks’ commercial credit standards as a proxy for bank
credit availability. We compare results from an “off-the-shelf”
macroeconomic vector autoregression(VAR) modelextended
to include the commercialloanmarket. Two different
specifications of the loan market are considered: a classical
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market with the quantity and price (that is, interest rate) on
loans and an augmented market with standards included as a
proxy forloan availability.We considerfirst whethergyrations
increditstandardsareimportantinexplainingloanandoutput
dynamics—that is, do standards “matter” for the macro-
economy? Next, do changes in the stance of monetary policy
cause lenders to change their standards? In other words, does
monetary policy work in part through lending standards, or
are changes instandards independent of policy? Last and
most generally, is the impact of monetary policy on output
diminished when we account for the impact of standards?
We present three principal findings. First, innovations or
unanticipatedshockstostandardshave asignificantimpacton
both commercial loans and output. Second, standards are not
very sensitive to changes in monetary policy, at least not the
policy shocks we identify with shocks to the federal funds rate.
Thus, changes in standards appear to be largely exogenous to
thepolicyprocess.Andthird,accountingforstandardsreduces
the importance of funds rate shocks on output.
Oneinterpretationofthesefindings,especiallyintheearlier
part of our sample, is in terms of the credit “actions” and
“crunches” described by Wojnilower (1980), Owens and
Schreft (1995), and Romer and Romer (1993). These studies
document a variety of actions by policymakers or legislators
determined to limit credit flows from banks to borrowers,
either to augmentopen market operationsthat seemed unable
toreduce lendingandspendingorto obviatethepolitical-heat-
creatingriseinloanratesthatwouldbenecessarytoslowcredit
growth.Defacto prime-rate ceilingsin the late1960s andearly
1970s,forexample,caused compression in the spreadbetween
bank loan rates and the federal funds rate whenever the funds
raterose,leavingbanksnochoicebutto rationloans,thatis,to
tighten standards. In fact, we find a strongnegative correlation
between loan spreads and standards over the 1960s and 1970s.
Tighteningsinstandardsovertheseperiodsseemtomarkthese
crunches reasonably well, which is one reason why we think
standards matter so much inaccounting for loans and output
andindiminishingtheimportanceofthefundsrate.Partofthe
putative effects of monetary policy, that is, open market
operations, may be the impact of these credit actions in
disguise.Whenpolicytighteningsdidnotinitiallyleadtocredit
curtailment, banks were “encouraged” to raise their standards.
The Federal Reserve largely eschews such credit actions
now, so variations in standards these days are more likely
manifested inbalance-sheet deterioration that causes banks
andother lendersto contractcreditsupply.In fact, theinterest
rate spread and standards are positively correlated post-1980,
as credit models with informational frictions usually imply
(Fuerst 1994): in the face of weakened firm balance sheets,
banks raise both loan rates and loan standards.
II. Observing Commercial Credit
Standards
TheFederalReservehassolicitedqualitativeinformationabout
banks’ commercial credit standards off and on since 1967
through its Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey on Bank
Lending Practices.2 Participating banks account for
approximately60percentofallloansbyU.S.banksandaneven
larger share of commercial and industrial (C&I) loans.3
Coverage is national, with participating banks from all twelve
Federal Reserve Districts. Theresponse rateto thequarterly
survey is virtually 100 percent.
Wefocusontheresponsesofbankerstothefollowingquestion:
Over the past three months, how have your bank’sc r e d i t
standards for approving loan applications for C&I loans
or credit lines—excluding those to finance mergers and
acquisitions—changed? 1) Tightened considerably,
2) tightened somewhat, 3) remained basically
unchanged, 4) eased somewhat, 5) eased considerably.
Thequestion’s emphasis has changed somewhat over the
years, necessitating some splicing of the series. From 1978 to
1984,whenthestandardsquestiondistinguishedbetweenloans
at prime and loans above prime, we use the average of the
responses to the two parts of the question. The question was
dropped from the survey between 1984:1 and 1990:1, so our
analysis excludes these “dark years.”4 Concerns about a credit
crunch led to reinstatement of the question in 1990:2. Since
then,lendershavebeenaskedtoreportseparatelyonstandards
f o rs m a l lf i r m s( s a l e so fl e s st h a n$ 5 0m i l l i o n )a n dm i d d l e - s i z e
and large firms. We use the latter series because it accountsfor
a larger percentage of totalloans, but the0.96 correlation
between the two series makes the choice immaterial.
The net percentage tightening—the number of banks
tightening less the number easing, divided by the number
reporting—is plotted in Chart 1, along with recession
indicatorsandthefederalfundsrate.5Tighterstandardsusually
precede recessions, and standards appear positively correlated
withthefederalfundsrate.Theglaringexceptiontothesecond
tendency is in 1980-81, when bankers reported easing
standards, notwithstanding the sharp rise in the federal funds
rate. After presenting our findings for the full sample period,
we investigate robustness when the curious easing over
1980-81 is excluded from the estimation.6F RBN YE c ono mi cPo lic yRev i ew/May2 002 21 9
Chart 1
Changes in Commercial Credit Standards 
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Sources: Board of Governors of the  Federal Reserve System, Senior 
Loan Officer Opinion Survey; Federal Reserve Board Statistical 
Release H.15: Selected Interest Rates.
Notes: Standards are not available between 1984:1 and 1990:2. 
The shaded bands indicate periods designated national recessions 
by the National Bureau of Economic Research.
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III. Vector Autoregressions with
Alternative Credit Markets
The proper modeling of bank loan markets is actually a long-
standing macro issue:
“...ar e c u r r e n tt heme in the literature and among
market participants is that the interest rate alone does
not adequately reflect the links between financial
marketsandtherestof theeconomy.Rather,it isargued,
the availability of credit and the quality of balance sheets
are important determinants of the rate of investment”
(Blanchard and Fischer [1989], emphasis added).
Inthespiritofthisdebate,wecomparetheimpactofmonetary
policy shocks under a “classical” market with loans and loan
rates with an augmented market that includes standards as a
proxy for credit availability. We consider three questions:
1) Does the classical formulation suffice, or do we need
standardsforanaccurateaccounting ofloan dynamics (that is,
do standards “matter”)? 2) Does tighter policy beget tighter
standards(thatis,istherea“standardschannel”ofpolicy)?and
3) Does accounting for standards alter the overall impact of a
policy shock, through whatever channel (that is, are policy
effects, or some part of them, really disguised credit effects)?
T oa n t i c i p a t e :y e s ,y e s ,a n dy e s .
ThecoreVAR is comprised of four macroeconomic
variables: the logarithmicvalue of real GDP,the GDPdeflator,
commodity prices, and the level of the federal funds rate. This
foursome represents a parsimonious but potentially complete
macroeconomy: output, the price level, “supply” (commodity
prices,notablyoil),and“demand”(thefundsrate).Thesefour
core variables have become more or less standard in macro
VAR modeling.7 Sources and additional information on these
series are presented in the appendix.
The three commercial credit variables are from several
sources. Outstanding commercial loans at banks are fromthe
quarterly Call Reports filed by commercial banks with federal
regulators. The commercial loan rate is, more precisely, the
most commonlycharged (modal)rate onnew loans extended
during the second week of the second month of the quarter.
This loan rate series is from the Federal Reserve’s Survey of
Terms of Bank Lending. Changes in commercial credit
standards (the net percentage tightening over the previous
quarter)arefromthe Loan OfficerOpinionSurvey.Allmodels
include four lags of all variables. All models, even the one
without standards, are estimated overthe disjoint period for
which the data on standards are available: 1967:1-1983:4 and
1990:2-2000:3.
VAR Regression Statistics
Regression statistics for the VAR with a classical loan market
are presented on the left side of Table 1.8 Thenumbers in the
table are the p-values for the null hypothesis that each
independent variable contains no information for the
dependent variable. Some of these relationships may be
familiar from the earlier lending channel literature, which
examinedtheempiricalevidenceonmonetarypolicyoperating
through the loan market.9 Lagged values of thefederalfunds
rate are highly significant in predicting output. The funds rate
doesnotpredictloans,butoutputdoes.Thesethreefactsareat
theheart oftheempiricalevidenceagainstthelendingchannel:
monetary policy impacts output, and changes in output (not
monetary policy) impact loangrowth. Defenders, of course,
object to inferring economic structure from reduced-form
timeseriesresults.Movingon,notethat thefunds ratepredicts
the loan rate, while the significance of the loan rate for loans is
somewhat weaker (0.038). The absence of a strong correlation
between interest rates and loans, evenin thesereduced-form
equations, suggests that the classicalloan market might be
missing something.220 CreditEffects in the MonetaryMechanism
Now consider the augmented market, with standards
(Table 1, right side). Severalfindings are worth noting. First,
lagged values of standards are highly significant in predicting
bothloansandoutput.Second,accountingforstandardspartly
reverses thetimeseriesevidenceagainstthelendingchannel;in
the augmented credit market, loansdo predict output. Finally,
thefundsratestill failstopredictloansintheaugmentedcredit
market, nor does it predict standards; standards are predicted
only by loans, commodity prices (not shown), and lagged
standards.10
In sum, we can draw several inferences from the regression
statistics. First, standards are highly significant in predicting
loansandoutput.Second, VAR results with a“classical” credit
market,excludingstandards, may be unduly negative towarda
lending channel hypothesis; once we control for standards,
loans do predict output. Loans are more like the dog and less
likethetailwhenwecontrolforstandards,andtheusual“bank
loans are just endogenous (to output)” critique loses force.
Third, contrary to a hypothesis of a standardschannel for
monetary policy, changes in the funds rate do not lead to
changesinlendingstandards.Ratherthantighteningstandards
when the funds rate rises, lenders just raise rates.
Impulse Responses and Variance
Decompositions
We now look at thedynamics implied by these regression
estimates. In particular, we focus on the impact thatshocks to
monetary policy have on the credit market variables—namely,
does monetarypolicyworkthrough thecredit market?Wealso
focus on the impact that shocks tothe credit variables have on
the macroeconomy. Following the literature, we identify
changes in monetary policy with shocks to the federal funds
rate, that is, the transitory, possibly small, perturbations in the
funds rate not attributable to current and lagged macro
conditions.11 The shock approach means, of course, that we
ignore the endogenous policy component: the systematic
changes ininterest rates associated with fluctuating business
conditions (Bernanke, Gertler, and Watson 1997). These
systematic changes in the funds rate may operate through
fluctuations in standards even though shocks to the funds rate
donot (asweshallconclude).Werevisitthatpossibilitylaterin
the paper.
For these exercises, the ordering of the variables matters. As
is typical, we place the financial market variables after the real
sector variables. Such an ordering assumes that financial
markets are sufficiently flexible to be affected by macro shocks
within the same quarter, but also assumes that the macro-
economy takes at least one quarter to respond to financial
markets. The financial variables are ordered loans, the funds
rate, the loan rate, and then standards, implying that shocks to
thequantityofloanscanaffectlendingtermswithinthequarter,
but lending terms only affect loans with a one-quarter lag.
Furthermore,ourordering allows unanticipated movements in
the funds rate to have an immediate (within the quarter) effect
on the loan rate and standards, while standards can impact the
othervariablesonlywithaone-quarterlag.Hence,thisordering
Table 1
Vector Autoregression Statistics for Classical and Augmented Credit Markets
Classical Credit Market: Loans and Rates Augmented Credit Market: Loans, Rates, andStandards
Dependent Variable Dependent Variable
Independent
V a r i a b l e YL F F RS YL F F RS
Y 0.000 0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.023 0.000 0.000 0.716
L 0.259 0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
FF 0.000 0.957 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.352 0.000 0.000 0.388
R 0.110 0.038 0.001 0.000 0.555 0.012 0.000 0.000 0.093
S 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.002 0.000
Source: Authors’ vector autoregression analysis using data sources in the appendix table.
Notes: The vector autoregressions comprise four lags of: Y = log GDP, P = log GDP deflator, PC = log commodity prices, L = log commercial and industrial
(C&I) loans, FF = the federal funds rate, R = the C&I loan rate, and S = the net percentage of lenders tightening C&I standards. Bothmodels are estimated
over 1967:1-1983:4 and1990:2-2000:3. Reportedare p-values for ajoint F-test in which the lagged variables are not significant.F RBN YE c ono mi cPo lic yRev i ew/May2 002 22 1
Chart 2
Impulse Responses for the Classical Credit Market
Source: Authors’ vector autoregression (VAR) analysis using data sources in the appendix table. 
Notes: The panels depict the response to one standard deviation. Innovations are plus or minus two standard errors. The VARs comprise four lags 
of: Y = log GDP, P = log GDP deflator, PC = log commodity prices, L = log commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, FF = the federal funds rate, 
and R = the C&I loan rate. The order of variables in the VARs is the order reported above. A continuation of this chart can be found in Chart A1.
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biases our results toward a finding that monetary policy works
through standards and against a finding that changes in
standards have a significant impact on the real economy.
Chart2plotstheimpulseresponsefunctionsfortheclassical
credit market. Thefunds rateshock, shown inthethird row,
third column, appears as a sharp, significant rise of roughly
75 basispoints, a bigtighteningnowadays,butnot unusualfor
the early part of the sample (pre-1990s). The output response
to the funds rate shock is textbook: no response for three
quarters, peak response at six-to-eight quarters, persisting222 CreditEffects in the MonetaryMechanism
Chart 3
Impulse Responses for the Augmented Credit Market
Source: Authors’ vector autoregression (VAR) analysis using data sources in the appendix table.
Notes: The panels depict the response to one standard deviation. Innovations are plus or minus two standard errors. The VARs comprise four lags 
of: Y = log GDP, P = log GDP deflator, PC = log commodity prices, L = log commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, FF = the federal funds rate, 
R = the C&I loan rate, and S = the net percentage of lenders tightening C&I standards. The order of variables in the VARs is the order reported 
above. A continuation of this chart can be found in Chart A2.
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effects for ten quarters. The trough in output is more than
0.5 percent below the pre-shock level.12 The path of the loan
rateparallelsthatofthefundsrate,suggestingthatbankersraise
rates in response to tighter policy, though not one-for-one.
The credit market dynamics arelargelyconsistent with the
regressionstatistics;loansarehighlysensitivetooutputshocks,
butnot viceversa,whiletheimpactofloan rateshocks onloans
is small and fleeting.
Next,weconsiderastandardsshockintheaugmentedcredit
market, as plotted in the last column of Chart 3. StandardsF RBN YE c ono mi cPo lic yRev i ew/May2 002 22 3
initiallytighten by 10 percent (onnet), but thetightening
cumulates for three quarters (these are changes in standards,
recall). Lenders commence easing after about eight quarters, a
n e c e s s ar yr e v e rs alt ou n d ot h ec um ul a t i v et i g ht e n i n gi n
quarters one through three. Theresponses of output and loans
are dramatic: both decline immediately and substantially;
output falls 0.5 percent at its trough and loans fall more than
2 percent. The low point in output comes about one quarter
after lenders stop tightening on net, a notable coincidence.
Loans continue contracting over the entire horizon, but the
contraction abates at about eight quarters, the same time
lenders start easing, another interesting coincidence. The
federal funds rate also falls about a year after the tightening in
standards, suggesting that policymakers lean against the
“headwinds” generated by tightening credit standards
(although we argue later that policymakers initially command
tighterstandards).In sum,shocksto standardsare followedby
a sharp contraction in loans, falling output, and easing
monetarypolicy—in short, a “crunch.”
Now, compare the impact of a funds rate shock in the two
models. The shocks are not substantially different in
magnitude(75versus60basispoints),buttheoutputresponse
is modestly smaller in the model with standards. The variance
decompositions make the diminished impact more readily
apparent (Table 2). Funds rate innovations account for
20 percent of the variance in theforecast error of output at
Table 2
Variance Decompositions for Vector Autoregressions for Classical and Augmented Credit Markets
Classical Credit Market: Loans and Rates
Augmented Credit Market: Loans, Rates,
and Standards
Dependent Variable Dependent Variable
Quarters Y PP C L F FRS Y PP CLF FRS
Y decomposition at 4 87.6 0.9 2.7 0.1 6.8 1.8 59.9 1.9 4.3 2.5 3.9 0.9 26.6
8 46.3 8.5 15.5 1.7 19.8 8.0 27.1 11.6 16.5 3.6 13.2 1.3 26.7
12 26.7 15.2 25.2 3.7 21.9 7.3 15.3 18.4 26.3 3.3 12.0 1.1 23.6
P decomposition at 4 0.4 74.3 23.0 1.2 0.7 0.3 0.5 77.1 20.4 1.2 0.4 0.2 0.2
8 3.4 48.8 46.9 0.6 0.2 0.1 5.0 53.0 40.7 0.8 0.1 0.1 0.3
12 4.7 38.9 53.1 1.9 1.4 0.1 5.4 42.8 48.4 1.3 1.1 0.0 1.0
PC decomposition at 4 4.9 10.5 82.5 0.6 1.4 0.1 9.7 13.3 74.4 0.3 1.3 0.0 1.0
8 3.6 13.3 73.2 2.8 6.9 0.2 6.2 15.0 70.7 1.4 5.4 0.2 1.1
12 2.8 12.1 65.6 7.6 11.6 0.2 5.6 13.5 67.7 2.2 8.8 0.3 1.9
L decomposition at 4 28.7 2.9 13.1 53.6 1.5 0.3 9.1 7.7 12.1 43.7 0.6 2.3 24.5
8 45.6 2.5 12.6 35.2 1.6 2.5 20.2 7.1 8.9 16.9 0.6 1.2 45.0
12 49.5 2.4 9.0 27.2 3.1 8.9 19.5 7.1 5.5 9.6 1.4 1.1 55.7
R decomposition at 4 20.8 18.1 29.0 1.5 26.8 3.8 26.8 27.2 15.8 1.5 19.5 3.9 5.2
8 23.1 22.8 34.4 1.2 13.8 4.7 27.4 30.3 23.7 0.7 9.2 5.2 3.5
12 20.8 24.8 34.6 1.8 10.2 7.8 24.0 29.9 25.9 1.6 6.9 8.0 3.6
Sd e c o m p o s i t i o n a t 4 1.3 1.2 10.6 20.6 1.3 2.2 62.8
8 4.8 2.7 9.7 20.1 2.3 4.4 56.0
12 4.2 5.4 12.5 17.6 2.4 3.8 54.0
FF decomposition at 4 20.7 14.0 32.6 1.1 29.7 1.9 28.2 22.1 18.2 2.8 19.8 2.7 6.1
8 24.9 18.3 34.5 1.0 17.5 3.7 29.1 25.4 23.6 1.8 11.3 4.8 4.6
12 22.6 20.6 33.1 1.8 14.3 7.6 25.8 25.7 22.9 2.8 9.3 8.1 4.7
Source: Authors’ vector autoregression analysis using data sources in the appendix table.
Notes: The decomposition for each variable at each horizon indicates the percentages of the variance of the forecast error attributable to a shock in the
corresponding column variable. The variable labels are: Y = log GDP, P = log GDP deflator, PC = log commodity prices, L = log commercial and industrial
(C&I) loans, FF = the federal funds rate, R= the C&I loan rate, and S = the net percentage of lenders tightening C&I standards. The order of variables in the
vector autoregressions is the order reported above.224 CreditEffects in the MonetaryMechanism
e i g h tq u a r t e r si nt h em o d e lw i t h o u ts t a n d a r d sv e r s u sj u s t
13 percent in the model with standards, and the difference
becomes larger at longer horizons. Standards shocks account
f o rmo r et h a naq u a r t e ro ft h ev a r i an c ed e c o m p o s i t i o ni n
output at every horizon, and an even larger share of the
decomposition in loans: 56 percent at twelve quarters.
Standards seem to matter al o tfor loans and output.
How do the credit market variables respond to a funds rate
shock in the augmented market? The standards response is
essentially a flat-line and insignificant, though, as we note
below, that result is somewhat fragile. Lenders raise rates in
response to a higher funds rate, but again, not strictly one-to-
one. Loans are less responsive to most of the shocks in the
augmented model, precisely because they are so sensitive to
changes in standards. Shocks to loans are associated with
tightening standards, but only a modest and short-lived
tightening in loan rates. This finding is consistent with the
creditnarratives(recountedlater) wherein de facto ceilingson
loan rates in the 1960s and early 1970s prevented these rates
from rising,inducing excess demand for bank loansand hence
tighter standards. The unresponsiveness of loan rates is also
consistent with rationing theories, wherein the incentive
problems that would be engendered by higher loan rates (only
the riskiest borrowers with little intention of repaying would
agree to such a loan) lead to rationing via nonprice terms, for
example, standards, instead.
Robustness
Recall the curious easing in standards over the 1980:3-1982:4
period amidst a sharp policy contraction and ashifttoward
nonborrowed reserves targeting bythe Federal OpenMarket
Committee. If we exclude that period, the funds rate has
marginally moreexplanatory powerforstandards,and therole
of the funds rate (relative to standards) in explaining output is
enhanced, although not enough to change our overall
conclusions.
Chart 4 plots the impulse responses for the VAR when the
1980:3-1982:4 period is excluded. Shocks to the funds rate in
this model do cause a significant, albeit small and brief,
tightening in standards; a 50-basis-point funds rate shock
causes analmost 4 percent net tightening instandards and a
muchbelated,but significant,easingafterabout eightquarters.
In other words, there does appear to be evidence of aweak
credit channel whereby a positive monetary policy shock leads
banks to raise their lending standards, which in turn causes
loangrowth andoutput toslow.The opposite would of course
holdtrueforapolicyeasing.Observethattheimpactonoutput
of the funds rate shock is more pronounced here than in
Chart 3, while the impact of the standards shocks on output
diminishes slightly.
Th ev a r i an ced e co m p os i t i o n s(n otre p or t e d )ch a n g e
accordingly:innovationsinthefundsrateexplain29percentof
the innovationsin outputat twelve quarters,versus 12percent
when the early 1980s period is included (Table 2). The
enhanced roleforthefundsratehereis hardlysurprising,as we
are excluding the majority of time when the FOMC
experimentedwithnonborrowedreservestargetingratherthan
fundsratetargeting.Thistime-periodexclusionalsolowersthe
share of output decomposition attributed to standards from
24 to 17 percent. That 17 percent is hardly a negligible figure,
however, and it represents a somewhat conservative estimate
because, as we have noted, the standards variable was ordered
last in the VAR.
IV. Interpreting the Role
of Standards
Whydoes controlling for standards diminish the impact of a
policy shock on output? The obvious omitted variable story,
that standards are correlated with the federal funds rate and
output,is only halftrue; lagged standards are highly correlated
with output, but not with the funds rate. Another omitted
variable story—tightening standards signal other shocks that
trigger monetary tightenings—works a bit better. A supply
shock,such as an unanticipated increase in commodity prices,
causes tighter standards, tighter policy, and lower output, so
when we control for the linkages between commodity prices,
standards, and output, policy pales in importance.13 Putting it
differently, the monetary tightening necessary to neutralize an
inflationary commodity shock depends on whether credit
standards are already tightening. If so, policymakers may have
less tightening to do.
The spikes in standards associated with credit disruptions
described in Wojnilower (1980), Romer and Romer (1993),
andOwensandSchreft(1995)suggesttousthatthesegyrations
in standards might matter because they mark real, forceful
interventionsincreditmarketsbypolicymakers(monetaryand
legislative), especially back in the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s
(Chart 5). Apart from the occasionally binding Regulation Q
ceiling on deposit rates, all three accounts note the de facto
ceilings in 1969, and again in the early 1970s, a result of
President Nixon’s wage and price controls. As a specific
example, in the 1970s episode, as Chairman of the Committee
on Interest and Dividends, Federal Reserve Chairman BurnsF RBN YE c ono mi cPo lic yRev i ew/May2 002 22 5
Chart 4
Impulse Responses for the Augmented Credit Market
Excluding 1980:3 to 1982:4
Source: Authors’ vector autoregression (VAR) analysis using data sources in the appendix table.
Notes: The panels depict the response to one standard deviation. Innovations are plus or minus two standard errors. The VARs comprise four lags 
of: Y = log GDP, P = log GDP deflator, PC = log commodity prices, L = log commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, FF = the federal funds rate, 
R = the C&I loan rate, and S = the net percentage of lenders tightening C&I standards. The order of variables in the VARs is the order reported 
above. A continuation of this chart can be found in Chart A3.
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Quarters
required justificationfrom bankersforraising theirprimerate.
Rising market rates were not reason enough, apparently. In
both instances, compressed loan spreads occurred during
policy tightenings, and hence reintermediation occurred
whereby arbitraging commercial borrowers shifted from
pricier commercial paper and other sources to cheaper bank
loans,oftenborrowingunderprearrangedlinesofcredit.Loan
growth accelerated, notwithstanding the tighter monetary226 CreditEffects in the MonetaryMechanism
M
Chart 5
Significant Monetary and Credit Events and 
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by the National Bureau of Economic Research. M = monetary tightening 
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Sources: Federal Reserve Board Statistical Release E.2: Survey of 
Terms of Business Lending, Table 2; Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, Senior Loan Officer Opinion Survey; Federal 
Reserve Board Statistical Release H.15: Selected Interest Rates.  
Notes: Standards are not available between 1984:1 and 1990:2. 
The loan spread is the commercial and industrial loan rate minus























policy. Bankers funded the increased loan demand by issuing
nonreservable liabilities and byinnovating entirely new
liabilitiesin somecases(RomerandRomer1993).Thwartedin
their efforts to slow lending via open market operations,
policymakers acted directly by jawboning and by imposing ad
hoc reserve requirements, credit controls, moral suasion, and
“intimidation” (Owens and Schreft 1995).
The loan spread compression and standards tightening
associated with these episodes are evident in Chart 6, at least
through the late 1970s.14 Falling spreads meant thatonly loans
to the highest quality, lowest risk borrowers were profitable,
hence standards were tightened.15 This pattern breaks in the
early 1980s, when the rising (and volatile) funds rate was
associated with higher (and volatile) spreads and the curious
easing in standards previously noted.
Spreads have clearly stabilized since roughly 1984,
presumablybecausetheFed haseschewed direct creditactions
o ni t so w na n di sl e s so f t e nf o r c e dt oa c tf o ro t h e ra g e n c i e s .
Consistent with this observation, the results in Table 3 suggest
ashiftin therelative role ofspreadsandstandardsoverthe two
p e ri o d s .S p re a d sh a v eb e e nm uc hm or es t a b l es i n cet h eea r l y
1980s, and the negative correlation between spreads and
standards before 1984 has become positive. Changes in
standards substituted for changes in spreads back then; now,
they seem more like complements in the credit allocation
mechanism.
These changing patterns, along with the decreased use of
moral suasion in recent years, raise the question of whether
lendingstandardsremainedinformativethroughoutthe1990s,
and whetherthey might be expected toremain soin thefuture.
Therelatively shorttrack recordofthepost-1990surveymakes
it impossibletosettlethisquestiondefinitively.Nonetheless,in
more parsimonious model specifications, necessitated by the
short sample, standards shocks had a significant effect on
output in both the pre-1984 and the post-1990 subsamples. In
addition, a formal statistical test failed to reject thehypothesis
that coefficients on lagged lending standards were unchanged
across subsamples.
Exactlywhy standardsappeartohaveremainedinformative,
in spite of the diminished incidence of credit “actions” and
“crunches,” remains an open question. One possibility,
suggested by the positive post-1984 correlation between
standards and spreads, is that the standards variable hasF RBN YE c ono mi cPo lic yRev i ew/May2 002 22 7
evolved from a pure measure of credit availability to an
increasingly informative gauge of the quality of banks’
borrower pools. Understanding the ways in which changes in
the financial system may haveaffected the interpretation of
banks’ reported lending standards is clearly an important
question deserving further investigation.
V. Conclusion
Gyrations in commercial credit standards matter a lot in
explaining fluctuations in loans: loans contract by 2 percent
following a mere 8 percent net tightening instandards, not an
especiallyseveretightening.Althoughsomeofthisdeclinemay
reflect reduced demand for loans,thesheer magnitude ofthe
decline is impressive: standards or whatever itisthey stand for
are clearly required for a proper VAR accounting of loan
dynamics.
Standards also matter a lot for output, and when properly
accountedfor, shockstothefundsratematterconsiderablyless
(than they do when standards are omitted). One reason that
standards likely matter for both loans and output is that they
markthedirectcredit “actions” bypolicymakersthat werenot
unusual up to the early 1980s.As the Fed has eschewed such
actions inrecent years (oravoided enforcing them), changesin
standards now serve more as a proxy for credit market
imperfections whereby banks alter standards in response to
deterioration in their own, or in firms’, balance sheets. These
factors may be more apparent today, as theforecasting power
of some of the traditional monetary policy indicators has
deteriorated.
Our principal finding is that part of the impact of
“monetary” policy is really overlooked, or misidentified,credit
e f f e c t sp r o x i e db yg y r a t i o n si ns t a n d a r d s .O nt h eo n eh a n d ,
when standards are taken into account, the importance of
monetary policy shocks for output diminishes. On the
(inevitable) other hand, our finding that lenders do not adjust
Table 3
Variance and Covariance of Commercial Loan Spread and Standards: Various Periods
1967:1 to 2000:3 1967:1 to 1984:1 1967:1 to 1979:4 1990:2 to 2000:3
Variance:
Spread 0.66 1.06 0.77 0.05
Standards 0.04 0.04 0.03 0.03
Correlation: Spread at t,
standards at t - k:
k = -4 -0.47 -0.59 -0.54 0.06
-3 -0.43 -0.53 -0.50 0.09
-2 -0.43 -0.54 -0.51 0.14
-1 -0.48 -0.61 -0.59 0.20
0 -0.44 -0.56 -0.58 0.37
1 -0.35 -0.44 -0.31 0.36
2 -0.20 -0.24 -0.02 0.56
3 -0.18 -0.21 0.07 0.61
4 -0.22 -0.25 0.09 0.56
Memo:
Ljung boxQ-statistics and
significance of correlations: k1 to k2
1 to 4 33.14 0.000 25.58 0.000 6.00 0.199 53.26 0.000
-4 to -1 115.25 0.000 95.16 0.000 65.33 0.000 3.33 0.504
-4 to 4 174.49 0.000 143.25 0.000 89.22 0.000 62.49 0.000
Source: Authors’ vector autoregression analysis using data sources in the appendix table.
Notes: The spread is the commercial and industrial loan rate minus the federal funds rate (in basis points). Standards are the net percentage of senior loan
officers reporting tighter standards from the previous quarter.228 CreditEffects in the MonetaryMechanism
s t a n d a r d si nr e s p o n s et op o l i c ys h o c k sr u n sc o n t r a r yt oa
narrow “standards” or lending channel of monetary policy.
Changesin lending standardsdo notappear to be endogenous
tothemonetarypolicymechanism.However,thisfindingdoes
not rule out broader effects—that is, standards tighten in
response to deteriorating balance sheets both at banks and at
firms, a deterioration that could be in response to changes in
monetary policy. Moreover, we have not investigated the
possibility that the systematiccomponent of monetary policy,
as opposed to the shocks, leads to changes in lenders’
standards.Giventheoverallimportanceofstandardssuggested
here,moreworkontheirproperinterpretationandassociation
with monetarypolicy seems warranted.F R B N YE c o n o m i cP o l i c yR e v i e w/M a y2 0 0 2 2 2 9
Appendix
Variable Descriptions








Total income earned domestically
or expenditure on domestic goods
and services, billions of chain-

















GDP deflator Ratio of nominal GDP toreal GDP,


















JOC-ECRI industrial price index,





































Loan rate Interest rate on C&I loans made
by domestic banks, annualized;



















Standards Net percentage of domestic banks
reporting tightenedstandards over
the previous quarter; during
1978-83, standards are computed
by averaging changes in credit







































aAll variables are in natural log valuesexceptloan rate, standards, andfederalfunds rate.
bJournal of Commerce-Economic Cycle Research Institute.230 CreditEffectsinthe MonetaryMechanism
Appendix (Continued)
Chart A1
Additional Impulse Responses for the Classical Credit Market 
Source: Authors’ vector autoregression (VAR) analysis using data sources in the appendix table. 
Notes: This chart is a continuation of Chart 2. The panels depict the response to one standard deviation. Innovations are plus or minus two standard 
errors. The VARs comprise four lags of: Y = log GDP, P = log GDP deflator, PC = log commodity prices, L = log commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, 
FF = the federal funds rate, and R = the C&I loan rate. The order of variables in the VARs is the order reported above. 
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Chart A2
Additional Impulse Responses for the Augmented Credit Market 
Source: Authors’ vector autoregression (VAR) analysis using data sources in the appendix table.
Notes: This chart is a continuation of Chart 3. The panels depict the response to one standard deviation. Innovations are plus or minus two standard 
errors. The VARs comprise four lags of: Y = log GDP, P = log GDP deflator, PC = log commodity prices, L = log commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, 
FF = the federal funds rate, R = the C&I loan rate, and S = the net percentage of lenders tightening C&I standards. The order of variables in the VARs 
is the order reported above. 













Response of Y to PC Response of P to L
Quarters Quarters Quarters Quarters Quarters











































































































































12 10 8 6 4 2














12 10 8 6 4 2


















Additional Impulse Responses for the Augmented Credit Market 
Excluding 1980:3 to 1982:4
Source: Authors’ vector autoregression (VAR) analysis using data sources in the appendix table. 
Notes: This chart is a continuation of Chart 4. The panels depict the response to one standard deviation. Innovations are plus or minus two standard 
errors. The VARs comprise four lags of: Y = log GDP, P = log GDP deflator, PC = log commodity prices, L = log commercial and industrial (C&I) loans, 
FF = the federal funds rate, R = the C&I loan rate, and S = the net percentage of lenders tightening C&I standards. The order of variables in the VARs 
is the order reported above. 
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QuartersEndnotes
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1. The mechanism requires imperfect substitutability between bank
deposits and bonds. Both the money and credit views require sticky
prices,orelseprices wouldadjustto offsetchanges in nominal money
and crediton real output.
2. The survey was initiated in 1964, but only theresults after 1967 are
officially available.
3. Participants are selected primarily by size and portfolio charac-
teristics (for example, a substantial share of C&I loans). The sample
size has varied from about 120 in the early years to approximately
60 atpresent. Banks are added or replaced as needed, for example,
due to mergers. The survey comprised a fixed set of twenty-two
questions fromits inception in 1964 until 1981. At that time, all
but sixof those questions were dropped to make room for more
ad hoc questions on emerging developments. In 1984, five of the
remaining six core questions were dropped, including the question
thatwe focus on. Recentsurvey results are available at<http://
www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/SnLoanSurvey/>.
4. According to Schreft (1990), the question on commercial credit
standards was dropped from the survey under the presumption that
such nonprice rationing would wanewith thederegulation of deposit
rates. The question may have been eliminated as part of the Paper
Work Reduction Act.
5. Weighting the responses over the 1990s by the extent of change
(somewhatversus considerably) did notchange the picture or the
results, nor did using a diffusion index. Integrating the changes
reported bylenders over time didnot work as well as any of the other
measures.
6. The consumer credit controlsimposed betweenMarch and July
1980 may have prompted easier commercial standards to replace lost
business on the consumer side. See Schreft and Owens (1991) for an
alternative interpretation.
7. See, for example, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans (1996) and
Bernanke and Mihov (1998).
8. To maintain comparability, we estimated both models with the
dark years (1984:1-1990:1) excluded.
9. See Ramey (1993)andthe discussioninBernankeand Blinder (1988).
10. Thoughnotreported,we alsoreplaced loanrateswithstandardsto
runatypeof racebetweenthetwo.Standardseasilyoutdistancedloan
rates in predicting loans, with significance levels an order or two
higher or more. Racing analogies may not be apt,however, since loan
rates seemto perform better with standardsin the model.
11. See Bernanke and Blinder (1992) and Friedman and Kuttner
(1996) and the citations therein. Bernanke and Mihov (1998)
recommend a hybrid indicator that accounts for the Federal Open
MarketCommittee(FOMC)experimentwithanonborrowedreserves
targeting over 1979-82. Our experiments with their series through
1996 (graciously provided to us by Mihov) did not change our main
results. Nor did simply excluding the entire 1979-82period
substantively alter our findings.
12. Responsesofallthelogarithmicvariablesrepresentthe cumulative
percentage change following the shock.
13. This hypothesis implies that the impact of commodity shocks on
output should also diminish when we account for standards. Though
no difference isapparent in the impulse responses, the variance
decompositions (Tables 1 and 2) reveal a slight diminishment in
quarters two and three, the same quarters over which standards
t i g h t e ni nr e s p o n s et ot h ec o m m o d i t yp r i c es h o c k .
14. Keeton (1986) has a similar chartin his article on depositrate
deregulation and credit rationing.
15. Notethatthelinearspecificationoftheequationsin ourempirical
work prevents us from distinguishing between policy effects when
market interest rates are below versus above an implicit ceiling. If we
could make such a distinction, we might have found a stronger link
from policy changes to changes in standards during times when
interestrates were high.References
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